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Abstract: This paper contributes to the policy evaluation literature by developing new strategies to study 
alternative policy rules. We compare optimal rules to simple rules within canonical monetary policy 
models. In our context, an optimal rule represents the solution to an intertemporal optimization problem 
in which a loss function for the policymaker and an explicit model of the macroeconomy are specified. We 
define a simple rule to be a summary of the intuition policymakers and economists have about how a 
central bank should react to aggregate disturbances. The policy rules are evaluated under minimax and 
minimax regret criteria. These criteria force the policymaker to guard against a worst-case scenario, but in 
different ways. Minimax makes the worst possible model the benchmark for the policymaker, while 
minimax regret confronts the policymaker with uncertainty about the true model. Our results indicate that 
the case for a model-specific optimal rule can break down when uncertainty exists about which of several 
models is true. Further, we show that the assumption that the policymaker’s loss function is known can 
obscure policy trade-offs that exist in the short, medium, and long run. Thus, policy evaluation is more 
difficult once it is recognized that model and preference uncertainty can interact. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper contributes to the policy evaluation literature by developing new 
strategies to study alternative policy rules.  We are interested in assessing the case that 
can be made for optimal rules as opposed to simple rules for policy.  Our specific focus is 
on monetary policy rules.  In our context, an optimal rule represents the solution to an 
intertemporal optimization problem in which a loss function for the policymaker and an 
explicit model of the macroeconomy are specified.  We define a simple rule as a 
summary of the intuitions policymakers and economists have about how a central bank 
should react to aggregate disturbances.   
Simple monetary policy rules have evolved since Friedman’s classic (1948) 
presentation of the k% money growth rule.  Modern versions of simple monetary policy 
rules typically embody a notion of “leaning against the wind”.
2  A central bank plays an 
active role in stabilizing macroeconomic aggregates when it works to offset adverse 
shocks.  The canonical modern example of a simple policy heuristic is Taylor’s rule 
(1993), in which the Federal funds rate rises in response to output relative to trend and by 
more than one-for-one with the inflation rate.  Taylor’s rule is motivated by the notion 
that a central bank should attempt to reverse aggregate demand shocks, whereas 
aggregate supply shocks should be allowed to operate unhindered in the economy. 
The distinction between optimal and simple rules has taken on particular 
significance in recent debates over the desirability of inflation targeting, as exemplified in 
the competing views expressed in Svensson (2003) and McCallum and Nelson (2005).  
The latter paper takes particular interest in the claim made by Svensson that targeting 
rules are preferred to instrument rules because the former embodies the restrictions 
intertemporal optimality places on the solution to the optimal policy problem.
3  As a 
                                                 
2Tobin (1983) distinguishes between fixed and reactive rules. Recent work on monetary 
policy evaluation focuses on the latter. 
3Some arguments that appear in the literature strike us as self-evidently weak, for 
example, the claim that an instrument rule is inferior to a targeting rule because the latter 
uses the entire information set the policymaker has at hand.  It is obvious that any 
information available for a targeting rule may be exploited by an instrument rule.  
  1theoretical matter, McCallum has shown that in principle an instrument rule may 
arbitrarily well approximate a targeting rule, so long as the rules are conditioned on the 
same information set.  Nonetheless, Svensson’s claim has force when targeting rules are 
compared to some classes of simple rules (e.g., Taylor rules) in which we are interested.
4   
This paper questions the case for optimal rules at two levels.  First, we consider 
the role model uncertainty plays in vitiating the superiority of optimal to simple rules.  As 
argued by McCallum and Nelson (2005)
5, the optimality of a rule with respect to a given 
economic environment begs the question of its evaluation when the true model of the 
economy is not known.   Our paper evaluates this issue by comparing model-specific 
optimal rules with simple alternatives.  Second, we compare simple and optimal rules 
from the perspective of frequency-specific effects on uncertainty.  Conventional policy 
assessments assume that the preferences of the policymaker are summarized by the 
variances of the aggregates under study.  As we discuss below, such preferences ignore 
the disparate short-, medium- and long-run affects of policy.  Since Brock and Durlauf 
(2004, 2005) and Brock, Durlauf, and Rondina (2007) show that the choice of a policy 
rule yields a frequency by frequency variance tradeoff, we argue that these tradeoffs 
should be reported to a policymaker, to account for different preferences with respect to 
fluctuations at different cycles.  We believe that such comparisons contain useful 
information for policymakers.    
Our analysis is in the spirit of Friedman (1948) who explicitly grounds his 
arguments for tying monetary policy to a fixed money growth rule on information 
limitations facing a central bank.  Friedman concludes his analysis with 
 
…I should like to emphasize the modest aim of the proposal. It does not claim to provide 
full employment…It does not claim to eliminate entirely cyclical fluctuations in output 
and employment.  Its claim to serious consideration is that it provides a stable framework 
of fiscal and monetary action, that it largely eliminates the uncertainty…of discretionary 
actions by government authorities…It is not perhaps a proposal that one would consider 
at all optimum if our knowledge of the fundamental causes of cyclical fluctuations were 
                                                 
4Notice that the comparison of targeting rules to simple instrument rules renders moot the 
claim that targeting rules are more transparent than instrument rules. 
5See McCallum (1988, 1999) for early discussions of model uncertainty and monetary 
policy that broadly study many of the questions we wish to consider. 
  2considerably greater than I think them to be; it is a proposal that involves minimum 
reliance on uncertain and untested knowledge.  (pg. 263) 
 
Model uncertainty has, due to the pioneering work of Hansen and Sargent ((2003) 
and especially (2007)) on robustness, become a major feature of current research.
6  In this 
paper we follow an approach developed in Levin and Williams (2003) and Brock, 
Durlauf, and West (2003, 2006) to evaluate policies in the presence of model uncertainty.  
The idea of this approach is to first construct a model space that includes all candidate 
models for the economy, evaluate policies for each of the candidate models, and then 
determine how to draw policy influences given the fact that the true model is unknown.  
This approach differs from the usual robustness analysis in that we do not focus on model 
misspecification which is measured local to a given baseline model.  Rather, our 
approach acknowledges the global character of model uncertainty.  
Given a model space, it is necessary to determine how to aggregate information 
on rule performance across the different models.  In this paper, we consider non-Bayesian 
approaches that are based on minimax and minimax regret criteria.  These approaches 
involve guarding against “worst case scenarios”, but do so in different ways that we 
formalize below. Relative to the Bayesian approach described below, neither minimax 
nor minimax regret requires the policymaker to take a stance on model space priors in 
order to compute posterior model probabilities. 
Our analysis does not address the question of the design of optimal rules in the 
presence of model uncertainty.  We regard this as an important, but distinct question from 
understanding the sensitivity of rules to model uncertainty.  We believe our exercise is 
useful because it provides insights into how to evaluate the performance of rules in the 
presence of model uncertainty that cannot be explicitly described in advance.  There are 
fundamental conceptual questions involved in thinking about policy effects when one 
cannot specify the support of the uncertainty faced by a policymaker.  Nevertheless, we 
believe insights into this difficult problem are found from understanding how rules 
perform within a model space when, by construction, the rules fail to account for model 
uncertainty.  Our approach to non-Bayesian decision theory follows Hansen and Sargent 
                                                 
6Examples that focus on monetary policy include Giannoni (2002), Onatski and Stock 
(2002) and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001). 
  3(who focus on minimax evaluation).  Since we operate within somewhat different model 
spaces, it requires additional justification for our approach.   
In terms of substantive conclusions, we find that for some standard univariate 
macroeconomic models there exist significant limitations to model-specific optimal rules.  
When model uncertainty is restricted to the case where the target variable (inflation in our 
example) is either entirely forward-looking or backwards-looking, minimax and minimax 
regret often choose rules that do not feedback on the lagged instrument variable (i.e., the 
output gap) when the policymaker aims to minimize the total unconditional variance of 
the target.   In contrast, the optimal rule for the forward looking model is favored when 
attention is restricted to the higher frequencies, even when the true model is uncertain.  
When we consider a hybrid model space, in which the relative weights of the backwards- 
and forward-looking components are unknown, the comparison of a model-specific 
optimal rule (based on the model where each component has equal weight) and a rule of 
thumb reveals that the model-specific rule is preferred when one focuses on overall 
variance and higher frequencies, whereas the rule of thumb is preferred for lower 
frequencies.  Taken as a whole, these results indicate how the case for a model-specific 
optimal rule can breakdown when one relaxes the assumption that the true model is 
known as well as the assumption that the appropriate loss function is known.   
  Section 2 describes our basic framework for assessing model uncertainty.  Section 
3 discusses the evaluation of frequency-specific effects of policies.  Section 4 applies our 
general ideas to policy evaluation when there is uncertainty about the respective 
importance of backwards- and forward-looking elements to the inflation process. Section 
5 provides summary and discussion of future research directions. A Technical Appendix 
which provides derivations is available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
2. Model uncertainty: basic ideas 
 
  At an abstract level, the issue of model uncertainty is easily described.  Suppose 
that a policymaker faces a choice among a set P of candidate policies.  Given  , which  Θ
  4captures whatever features of the economy matter to the policymaker, a policymaker 
experiences a loss associated with those features 
 
  ( ). l Θ  (1) 
 
The features defined by Θ  are not, for interesting cases, a deterministic function of a 
policy and so are in general described by a conditional probability 
 
  ( ) ,, p dm µ Θ  (2) 
 
where we explicitly allow the state of the economy to depend on the policy choice,  p , 
the available data, d, and the model of the economy that is assumed to apply, m.  Data 
dependence in this conditional probability may incorporate both direct dependence, as 
occurs in an autoregression, where forecasts depend on past realizations, or uncertainty 
about parameters.   For simplicity, we measure losses as positive, so a policymaker 
wishes to minimize (1) by choosing a policy to affect (2).  Our goal in the analysis is to 
relax the assumption that the policymaker knows the correct model of the economy, m.  
Rather, we assume that the policymaker knows that the correct model lies in a model 
space M.  This space reflects uncertainty about the appropriate theoretical and functional 
form commitments needed to allow quantitative analysis of the effects of a policy.   
  In this paper we focus on non-Bayesian decision criteria with respect to model 
uncertainty.
7 In order to understand why we take this route, recall that the standard 
Bayesian solution to the optimal policy problem solves 
 
  () () ( ) ( ) ( ) min , , min , , pP pP
mM
E lp d M E lp d m m d µ ∈∈
∈
Θ= Θ ∑  (3) 
 
                                                 
7Hansen and Sargent (2007) provide an extensive discussion on non-Bayesian approaches 
to macroeconomic analyses of the type we explore.  Their analysis develops a 
comprehensive theory of robust decisionmaking.  See also Brock, Durlauf and West 
(2003), whose formulation of model uncertainty and rule comparison we follow here. 
  5where  ( md µ )  denotes the posterior probability that model m  is the correct one.
8,9 
Recalling that  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) dm md m µµ µ ∝  (4) 
 
the Bayesian approach thus requires explicit assignment of model priors.   The 
assignment of these priors is problematic since a researcher rarely possesses any 
meaningful prior knowledge from which priors may be constructed.  The default prior in 
the model uncertainty literature assigns equal probabilities to all elements of the model 
space; but as discussed in Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) such an approach is hard to 
justify.  Hence, a first limitation of Bayesian approaches to model uncertainty is the 
requirement of introducing priors that have little meaning.  There has been work on 
evaluating the robustness of Bayesian inferences to prior choice in the statistics literature 
as well as efforts in the econometrics literature to develop alternatives to the diffuse 
priors that are used in the model uncertainty literature, but neither of these approaches is 
well understood for the context we study.  We should note that the problem of defining 
priors continues to be a barrier to the adoption of Bayesian methods.
10  
Second, beyond the difficulty of specifying priors, we feel that there are other 
good reasons, for at least some exercises, to avoid weighting models by posterior 
weights.  These have to do with the interpretation of the likelihood component in (4), i.e. 
( md µ ) . In our judgment, the utility of models is context dependent.  A model which fits 
the overall data well, i.e. receives a high value of  ( ) md µ , may perform relatively poorly 
when employed to consider regime changes when compared to another model whose 
overall fit is poorer.  It is easy to see how this could be the case when the model which 
fits historical data less well is relatively immune to the Lucas critique.   
                                                 
8We do not address the issue of how to interpret these probabilities when none of the 
models is true. This is a deep and unresolved problem; see Key, Perrichi and Smith 
(1998) for some efforts to address. 
9The Bayesian solution to model uncertainty involves model averaging, an idea suggested 
in Leamer (1978) and developed in detail in Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997).    
10Freedman (1991) has rejected the Bayesian approach for this reason. 
  6Third, it is important to recognize that the model spaces studied in 
contemporaneous macroeconomics have not arisen sui generis; they reflect a history of 
theoretical and data work and as such, their relative fits reflect the interaction of macro 
modeling and empirical work.  Nonetheless, we study a class of macro models that 
evolved to achieve better fit because of data mining.  More generally, one should not 
reify a model space as representing the unique set of candidate models that were available 
to a researcher prior to data analysis. Instead, it should be recognized that the 
econometric versions of macro models that are under consideration (at a moment in time) 
have been influenced by the path of empirical work.  
Finally, there are reasons to believe that individual preferences may treat model 
uncertainty differently from other types of uncertainty. These arguments are often based 
on experimental evidence of the type associated with the Ellsberg paradox, in which 
individuals appear to evaluate model uncertainty differently from other types. Put 
differently, experimental evidence suggests that preferences exhibit ambiguity aversion 
as well as risk aversion, when model uncertainty is considered.  For our purposes, what 
matters is that the evidence of ambiguity aversion suggests a tendency to guard against 
the worst case scenario with respect to models; this idea is developed in Hansen and 
Sargent (2007) and Brock, Durlauf and West (2003).   
Non-Bayesian decision criteria attempt to avoid dependence of inferences on 
model probabilities guarding against especially bad outcomes.  At an intuitive level, these 
approaches abandon the search for optimal rules (in the Bayesian decision theory sense) 
in favor of good rules, where good is equated with the notion that the rule works 
relatively well regardless of which model is true.  The best known approach is the 
minimax criterion, proposed by Wald (1950), under which a policy is chosen to minimize 
the expected loss under the least favorable model (relative to that rule) in the model set.  
The minimax policy choice is, for our formulation 
 
  ( ) ( ) min max , , pP mME lp d m ∈∈Θ . (5) 
 
The minimax approach has been pioneered by Hansen and Sargent for macroeconomic 
contexts and forms the basis of the literature on robustness analysis.  F r o m  t h e  
  7perspective of the economic theory literature, versions of minimax have been justified by 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Wang (1994).     
A standard criticism of the minimax criterion is that it is inappropriately 
conservative because it assumes the worst case possible in assessing policies.  The force 
of this criticism, in our view, depends on whether the policy choice is driven by a 
relatively implausible model.  This of course leads back to the question of model 
probabilities, the reasons for eschewing we have already given.  Nevertheless, the 
extreme conservatism of minimax leads us to consider an alternative criterion: minimax 
regret. 
Minimax regret was originally proposed by Savage (1951) to avoid the pessimism 
of minimax by moving away from the idea that the worst outcome should be the 
benchmark comparison.  Rather, the focus in minimax regret is on the relative loss 
associated with choosing a policy in absence of knowledge of the correct model.  For a 
given policy p and model m, the regret  ( ) ,, R pdm associated with the policy choice is 
defined as  
 
  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ,, ,, m i n ,, pP R pdm El pdm El pdm ∈ =Θ − Θ . (6) 
 
Regret therefore measure the loss incurred by a policy given a model relative to what 
would have incurred under the optimal policy for that model.  The minimax regret policy 
is correspondingly defined by 
 
  ( ) min max , , pP mMR pdm ∈∈ . (7) 
 
Seminal work by Manski (2005) has generated a great deal of attention in the 
microeconometrics literature for minimax regret.
11  As far as we know, minimax regret 
                                                 
11Chamberlain (2001) is an important precursor in suggesting minimax regret. See Brock 
(2006) and Manski (2006a,b) for applications. 
  8has not been used to study macroeconomic questions in general, let alone with respect to 
questions associated with policy evaluation.
12  
The minimax regret criterion’s appeal for policy comparison may be seen in the 
following example. Suppose that there are two policies and two possible models.  For  
policy 1, there is a loss under model 1 of 22 and a loss under model 2 of 21.  For policy 2, 
the losses under models 1 and 2 are 23 and 3 respectively.  Under the minimax criterion, 
policy 1 is chosen since the maximum loss under it is 22 versus a maximum loss of 23 
under policy 2.  Under minimax regret policy 2 is chosen, since the maximum regret for 
policy 1 is 18 whereas for policy 2 it is 1.  The reason why minimax regret chooses a 
different model than minimax is that under model 1, both policies lead to similar losses, 
whereas under model 2, the losses are quite different.    
This example illustrates a key source of the appeal of minimax regret, namely, the 
criterion “normalizes” policy comparisons to account for the fact that certain realizations 
of the unknown state of nature (in our case, the correct model) are associated with 
relatively high losses regardless of the policy choice.  In the language of classical 
decision theory, minimax regret has the virtue that it subtracts off for the loss associated 
with each candidate action the inevitable loss associated with a particular model, i.e. the 
loss under the model-specific optimal rule.   
  One objection to the minimax regret criterion is that decisionmaking under it is 
not required to obey the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), 
something first shown in Chernoff (1954).  It is not clear that this axiom is appropriate 
for policy decisions, as opposed to individual ones. Without focusing on the 
individual/policymaker distinction, we can see reasons why the axiom may not be 
natural.  The axiom in essence states that one’s preferences over different pairs of actions 
does not depend on the context in which they are made, where the total choice set is part 
of the context.  This is not an obvious requirement of rationality.
13  In absence of the 
                                                 
12After writing this paper, we discovered Eozenou, Rivas and Schlag (2006) who provide 
a brief application of minimax regret to a question in economic growth to illustrate 
methods the authors have developed and as such is a macroeconomic example.  
13Blume, Easley, and Halperin (2006) argue, for example, that an appropriate 
axiomatization of rationality should not require that agents have preferences which obey 
certain consistency conditions over all possible states of the world, as is required by 
  9axiom, there do exist coherent axiom systems that produce minimax regret as the 
standard for evaluation; Stoye (2006) is the state of the art treatment.  We note that in 
Stoye’s system, for example, minimax regret obeys a weakened version of IIA called 
independence of nonoptimal alternatives, which means that the introduction or removal 
of a possible choice that is never the optimal one for any state of nature, will not matter in 
comparing the other choices.   
  We do not predicate our interest in minimax regret as a method of comparing 
policies on a strong adherence to any particular argument against the IIA assumption.  
We report minimax comparisons in addition to minimax regret comparisons to see where 
the criteria differ in practice.  As will be apparent, minimax regret and minimax produced 
qualitatively similar results.  We do not interpret this as indicating that one of the criteria 
is redundant, rather we feel it reinforces our general conclusions.  
  
 
3.  Frequency-specific effects of policies 
 
  In this section we consider rule performance with respect to fluctuations at 
different frequencies.  Standard analyses of the effects of policies focus on weighted 
averages of the unconditional variances of the states and possibly the controls.  Hence, it 
is common to compare policies by considering, for example, a weighted average of the 
unconditional variances of inflation and unemployment.  Such calculations thus mask the 
effects of policies on the variance of fluctuations at different frequencies. 
  Brock and Durlauf (2004, 2005) and Brock, Durlauf, and Rondina (2007) argue 
that fundamental tradeoffs in the variance associated with different frequencies of state 
variables can arise for macroeconomic contexts of the type conventionally studied.  We 
describe these tradeoffs for a one dimensional system 
 
  t  (8) 
                                                                                                                                                
() () () 1 , tt t t t xE xA L x B L u W L βε + =+++
 
Savage, but rather that rationality requires certain consistency conditions only over states 
under consideration.  While they do not explicitly pursue this approach as a critique of 
irrelevance of independent alternatives, their work can be used to justify its exclusion as a 
rationality requirement.   
  10 
with feedback rule 
 





x f ω denote the spectral density of the state when control rule   is applied.  Let  C
NC
t x    the system when  0 t u denote ≡ , i.e. there is no control;  ( )
NC
x f ω  is the associated 
tral density matrix. spec
14  Each choice of control can be understood as producing a 
sensitivity function  () S ω  such that 
 
  () () ()
2 CN
xx fS f
C ω ωω = . (10) 
ifferent choices of the feedback rule thus shape the spectral density of the state 
set of feasible 
 
D
variables relative to the no control baseline.  Hence, one can characterize what feedback 
rules can achieve in terms of frequency-by-frequency effects on the state by 
characterizing the set of sensitivity functions that are available to the policymaker.  This 
is the key notion underlying the study of design limits for policy choice.
15
  It turns out that there is a simple way to characterize the 
sensitivity functions in univariate systems.  For each specification of a model of the 
uncontrolled system M and a control C, it must be the case that the associated sensitivity 
function obeys 
 
  () ()()





= ∫ . (11) 
                                                
 
 
14When the uncontrolled system contains explosive or unit roots in the AR component, 
then the spectral density will not exist.  Our results on restrictions on the sensitivity 
function still hold in this case.   
15Brock and Durlauf (2004, 2005) give initial treatments of these issues. Brock, Durlauf, 
and Rondina (2007) provides a detailed theory. 
  11As discussed in Brock, Durlauf, and Rondina (2007)
16, if the system has no forward-
looking elements, i.e. 0 β ≡ , then the constraint   depends only on the unstable 
autoregressive roots of the unconstrained system.  The constraint equals 0 if there are no 
such roots, and is positive otherwise. The constraint is thus independent of the choice of 
control.  Since 
( , MC κ )
() ( ω
2 log S )  cannot be less than 0 for all frequencies, it must be the case 
that  ()
2
S ω  cannot be less than 1 for all frequencies.  Therefore, it is impossible to 
induce uniform reductions in the spectral density of the state variable relative to its value 
when there is no control, i.e. reductions at some frequencies require increases at others. 
Of course, the overall variance may be reduced.  
  The results are more complicated for forward-looking systems.  When 
, it is possible for a rule to reduce the variance of the state at all frequencies, 
although whether this is possible will depend on the values of the polynomials in (8). 
Brock, Durlauf and Rondina (2007) show that a variance-minimizing rule may increase 
variance at some frequencies, even when a uniform reduction at all frequencies is 
possible. 
0,1) β ∈ (
  Should a central bank evaluate rules on the basis of frequency specific effects?  
One reason why a central bank should do so concerns problems of measuring low 
frequency components of state variables, which is discussed in Onatski and Williams 
(2003).
17  Low frequency behavior is of course hard to identify.  Such measurement 
problems take on particular importance if it is believed that long-run movements in the 
data are those outside the control of the central bank.  For these reasons, it may be 
reasonable for a policymaker to compare the behavior of rules over integrals of “trimmed 
spectral densities,” i.e. integrating spectral densities over [ ] [ ] ,, π ςς π −−∪  instead of 
[ ] , π π − .
18    
                                                 
16The results in Brock, Durlauf and Rondina (2007) for backwards-looking systems 
modulo details, may be found in the control theory literature; the results on forward-
looking systems are new.   
17Brock, Durlauf, Nason, and Rondina (2007) pursue this issue with respect to the effects 
on policy evaluation of alternative detrending methods. 
18The issue concerns integrating spectral densities to compute losses, not to detrend data. 
In which case, the argument does not justify use of ad hoc filters. 
  12  A second argument for considering frequency-specific effects is based on 
nonseparable preferences. Under nonseparable preferences, a policymaker assigns 
different weights to different frequencies to calculate expected welfare.  Otrok (2001) has 
a useful example where the weights on different frequencies can differ by more than 9:1.  
According to Otrok, if preferences exhibit habit persistence the loss associated with 
volatility at high frequencies is greater than the loss associated with volatility at low 
frequencies.   
    Otrok’s results suggest that the study of frequency-specific losses may be 
important in understanding the role of preference uncertainty in evaluating policy rules.  
We can imagine two levels where such uncertainty exists.  First, an analyst may not be 
certain about the preferences of a policymaker; hence he will want to report frequency-
specific effects so that his findings may be used by policymakers with different 
preferences.  Second, a policymaker who is uncertain about public preferences over, say, 
inflation and the output gap, may wish to account for this uncertainty in evaluating 
policy, i.e. to account for lack of knowledge of whether or not these preferences are 
separable.  In this case, a policymaker will want to understand how losses occur for a 
policy at different frequencies.   
  The upshot of this discussion is that we believe part of the communication 
exercise for policymakers should involve reporting frequency specific comparisons. 
 
 
4. Model uncertainty and monetary policy evaluation: some illustrations 
 
In this section, we consider two analyses of rule of thumb versus optimal policies 
where model uncertainty is present.  We follow Levin and Williams (2003) in placing 
primary focus on model uncertainty with respect to backwards- and forward-looking 
expectations in Keynesian models.  In the context of the Phillips curve, the 2005 special 
issue, “The econometrics of the New Keynesian price equation”, in the Journal of 
Monetary Economics reveals little consensus on this issue.  For example, the Rudd and 
Whelan paper is especially clear about how disagreements over inflation dynamics create 
uncertainty for new Keynesian model building.  The difference between backwards- and 
  13forward-looking models represents the modern instantiation of disagreements over the 
nature of the Phillips curve that helped launch the rational expectations revolution.  
In our analysis, we consider a univariate system where inflation rate  t π  is 
controlled by the output gap  .  Model-specific optimal rules will be constructed on the 
















⎣ ⎦ ∑ . (12) 
 
This corresponds to an “inflation nutter” in that volatility in the control variable is not 
considered.  In subsequent work we consider richer loss functions, notably ones where 
the volatility of the control also matters, but this one is useful in illustrating our main 
ideas. 
 
a. theory uncertainty: backwards- versus forward- looking models 
 
We first consider the evaluation of policies when model uncertainty is represented 
by alternative forward-looking and backwards-looking theories of inflation. Our model 
space thus contains two candidates. The first is a backwards-looking model 
  
  11 tt B t t t ab y π π ε −− =+ + ;  ε ∼ WN. (13) 
 
The optimal feedback rule for this model   is shown in the Technical Appendix B O
19 to be 
 





t π =−  (14) 
 
                                                 
19 The optimal policy calculations performed in this section and Section 4.c are similar to 
those found in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), especially for forward-looking models.  
  14This is the same as the optimal feedback rule that minimizes the unconditional variance 
of the state. Notice that when the disturbance is not white noise the optimal rule will 
contain lagged state variables. 
Our alternative forward-looking model is 
  
  11 tt t F t t t Eb y π βπ εε +− =+ + ∼ ;  WN. (15) 
 
The optimal feedback rule ( ) is shown in the Technical Appendix to be  F O
 








− =− + . (16) 
 
Eq. (16) reflects the substantial smoothing typical of timeless perspective optimal rules in 
forward looking models.  An explicit expression for   in terms of current and past  t y t π  
can be derived if β δ < .  
 In  addition  to   and   we consider two additional rules.  The first is a rule of 
thumb (
F O B O
RoT ) 
 
  t yf t π =−  (17) 
 
where, in addition to the negative sign, our choice of the coefficient  f  is such that the 
policy instrument is reacting to innovations in the inflation series more than one for 
one.
20 Second, we consider a restricted optimal rule ( F RO ) for the forward-looking 
model, by which we mean rules restricted to the form  t yf t π =  in which the parameter f 
                                                 
20In this sense there is an analogy with the celebrated “Taylor principle” for monetary 
policy rules. The Taylor principle is defined in contexts where the policy rule is a 
nominal interest rate rule and the interest rate responds more than one for one to inflation. 
This ensures that when inflation increases the real interest rate increases because of the 
policy reaction. Thus, our focus on a single-equation model for inflation where the output 
gap is the policy instrument makes the analogy with the Taylor principle a loose one. The 
key property for our rule of thumb is that the instrument “leans against the wind” and that 
this reaction is relatively strong. 
  15is chosen to minimize (12), which follows a candidate rule initially suggested in Levin 
and Williams (2003).  The restricted optimal rule is shown in Brock, Durlauf and 
Rondina (2007) to take on a value of the coefficient  f  so that 
 













= . (18) 
 
  We now consider how these different rules perform given uncertainty about 
whether the true model is backwards-looking or forward-looking.  We focus on the 
parameterizations  0.9, 0.9 a
β
δ





= ) for the state 
equation and employ the normalization 
2 1 ε σ = .
21    
We study a rule of thumb motivated by uncertainty about the backwards- versus 
forward-looking specifications (13) and (15) rather than uncertainty about the parameters 
 and   within the models. This suggests the employment of a rule of thumb ( B b F b RoT ) 
that is normalized with respect to the slope parameter   where  b ( ) 1 B bb F b µµ =− + , for 







22 the magnitude of the feedback parameter ensures 
that the reaction of the control to the state is relatively strong.  
                                                 
21Our choices of   and   are motivated by Woodford’s (2003) preferred estimates for 
the slope of the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve of 0.096 and the Rudebusch and Svensson 
(1999) preferred estimate of the slope in the backwards-looking Phillips Curve of .14.  
Although there is uncertainty surrounding the value of slope of alternative Phillips curve 
specifications (for example, Gali and Gertler (1999) suggest an estimate for the 
backwards-looking PC slope of 0.081 while they propose a range for the NKPC in 0.015 
and 0.037), we believe that fixing the slope in each Phillips Curve equation at .1 is 
appropriate in order to allow us to focus on the uncertainty with respect to the presence of 
the backwards-looking versus forward-looking elements of the state dynamics. 
F b B b
22Given that we consider the case  .1 BF bb = =  the choice of µ  is irrelevant for the results 
reported. Experiments with different choices of   and   (and in turn of  B b F b µ ) did not 
yield qualitatively different results with respect to the main messages we wish to 
communicate from our exercises.  
 
  16  Tables 1–4 present results for the optimal backwards-looking rule  , equation 
(14), the optimal forward-looking rule  F O , equation (16), the restricted optimal rule F
B O
RO , 
equation (18), and the rule of thumb, RoT . The spectral densities induced by these rules 
are presented in Figures 1 and 2.  The various loss calculations are predicated on the loss 
function (12) and either on the backwards-looking model (13) or the forward-looking 
model (15).   Policymaker losses are reported for the backwards- and forward-looking 
models across the four policy rules in Tables 1 and 2.  Tables 3 and 4 include minimax 
and minimax regret calculations.  Besides the total variance of t π , Tables 1 4 contain the 
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s reveal how frequency-specific preferences matter for policy evaluation.  For 
example, 
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦














 represents loss when a policymaker only cares about higher 









⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 indic ss fo ate lo r all but the lower 
frequency fluctuations.  These approximate the frequency intervals considered by Otrok 











π  correspond to ∞, 8, 4, 2.67, and 2 
 Consider first the performance of different rules when the backwards-looking 
periods per cycle, respectively.  
 
model (13) is true.  Table 1 shows, not surprisingly, that   dominates the  ,  B O F O F RO , 
and  RoT policy rules.  However, the  F RO  and RoT policy rules yield total variances 
close to  , which has a total variance equal to the normalized variance of the shock .  
In contrast,   performs poorly generating a total variance nearly four times larger. 
B O t ε
F O
  The frequency intervals contain information that explains the poor performance of 
the   rule for the backwards-looking model (13).   Across the frequency intervals  F O

























, this rule produces variances of 0.15, 3.15, 0.28, 
F
t π appears in Figure 1, which plots spectral densities of  t π  across the four policy rules for 
the backwards-looking model (13).  Note that the  B O ,  F
and 0.14, which appear in the second line of Table 1.  Thus, the   rule creates large 
fluctuations in  in the middle to low frequencies.  This spike in the spectrum of 
O
t π
RO , and RoT rules generate 
rly flat spectra that reflect the ability of these rules to annihilate fluctuations in 
t π across all frequencies. Since the  F O  rule cannot eliminate movem  in  t π  at the 
business cycle frequencies (i.e., the middle to low frequencies), which maybe the ones 
 policymaker cares about most, it appears costly for the policymaker’s staff to rely on 
the forward-looking model (15) when the underlying model is not.    




π  explains the behavior of  F O  in the backwards-looking 
model.  Under this policy rule,  t π  is an ARMA(2,1) process with associated MA() ∞  of 









































⎝⎠ . (20) 
The discriminant 
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞















 is negative given our calibrations, which 
yields complex conjugate roots for the polynomial in the denominator of the MA process 
  18(19). In this case, the spectral density of the state produces a peak at business cycle 
frequencies.   
 In  contrast,  F RO  policy produces a more parsimonious AR(1) process with 





















⎛⎞ −+ − ⎜⎟ + ⎜⎟
⎜⎟
⎝⎠
No spurious cycles are induced in this case because the policymaker is able to wipe out 
the first-order serial correlation in  at almost all frequencies.  Figure 1 provides 
vidence that much the same holds for the   and 
 
  t π
e B O F RO  policy rules, conditional on the 
 p rules
uency interval 
loss function (12) and the backwards-looking model (13). 
When one considers the frequency-specific effects of policies, some interesting 
differences emerge in the comparisons.  The olicy   are evaluated differently across 




example, the  F O  rule performs better than  B O  at the low frequencies, 
















⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.  Since time 
ren t supp
the   policy rule in the backwards-looking model (13) depends on the loss function 
ance of the 
separable prefe ces place less weight on the   frequencies, it shows tha ort for 
(12).  Although this result is not controversial, the superior perform  policy 
rule in the backwards-looking model (13) at specific frequency intervals suggests that the 
choice of the ‘best’ policy relies on knowledge of the policymaker’s preferences. 
Table 2 and Figure 2 record results when the forward-looking model (15) is true.  




RO , and RoT  policies for total variance as well as 
across the frequency intervals on which we have focused.   Note that the  B O ,  F RO , and 




olicies generate losses three to eight times larger than produced by the  F O  policy 
rule at the high frequencies.  H we  the superiority of  F O  is not as clear cut as it is for 
B O  when the true model is the backwards-looking model (13). At the    iddle 
encies, the losses under the  B O ,  F
to 
freq RO , and RoT  policies are close to those 
produced by the  F O  rule when the forward-looking model (15) is correct.  Thus, model 
ertainty creates an asymmetry in the conduct of policy evaluation.   
We present minimax and m m gret ca tions in Tables 3 and 4 to 
evaluate the stren  of the case for the model-specific optimal rules.  The tables reveal 
that the preferred rule depends on the criterion used to evaluate policy
unc
maker loss.  For 
total va
ini ax re lcula
gth
riance, Table 3 show that  B O  is favored under minimax, but minimax regret 
chooses the  F RO  rule according to Table 4.
23  This shows that when a rule performs 
poorly it affects policy comparisons.  Given that a policymaker strives to mitigate the 
impact of the worst outcomes, we argue that minimax regret is preferred for policy 
evaluation.  Unlike minimax, minimax regret is designed to account for these efforts by 
the policymaker.   
Frequency-specific comparisons produce different conclusions.  Tables 3 and 4 
show that minimax never selects  B O , while minimax regret chooses  F O  most often 
across the frequency intervals.  Un minimax, the  der  RoT  policy domi t the low to 
middle
nates a
.  At the middle to high frequencies, minimax favors either the  F O  or  F RO  rules.  
The  F O  rule is not chosen by mi ax regret only at the middle to low frequency 
interval, where the
nim
RoT policy performs best, and at  high to low frequency interval, 
where the  F
the 
RO  policy dominates.  Although Tables 3 and 4 indicate at th F  rule 
gener s the largest total variance either for minimax or for minimax regret, this rule 
 th e O
ate
                                                 
23We note that the minimax regret choice of  F RO  for overall variance is the one case 
where independence of irrelevant alternatives is violated: if    is removed from the 




F O  is 
removed, another rule becomes the best choice among the candidate rule for the forward-
looking case and so alters the regret calculations. Our comparisons all fulfill the 
independence of nonoptimal alternatives criterion described above.  
 
  20performs best at the higher frequencies under these criteria.  Moreover, minimax regret 
often settles the  F O  rule across most of the frequency intervals.  Thus, total v iance 
can mask frequency-specific policy trade-offs. 
This section shows that policy evaluation is sensitive to model and loss function 
uncertainty.   The m max and minimax regret exercises reveal that frequency-specific 
fluctuations matter most for the latter type of
 on  ar
 uncertainty.  Given the backwards- and 
forward
This section studies a hybrid model that has backwards- and forward-looking 
ld equations (13) and (15) into a continuum of potential hybrid models 
y varying the weights on the backwards- and forward-looking components.  The result is 
 
ini
-looking models of equations (13) and (15), the policymaker chooses the  F O  rule 
most often when he places more weight on high frequency fluctuations under minimax or 
minimax regret.  For total variance, the minimax and minimax regret are split on which 
policy rule to follow.  This suggests that the benefits of optimal rules are conditional on 
the loss function imposed on the policymaker. 
 
 
b. hybrid models 
 
elements.   We me
b
  () ( ) 11 1 1 tt t t t t t Ea b y π θ β πθ π θ ε ε +− − =− + + + ∼ ;      WN (22) 
 
where  [ ] 0,1 θ ∈  and   () ( ) 1 BF bb θθ θ =+ − b .  Under the objective function (12) it can be 
hown that the fully optimal policy for this model under the objectiv
 

















=    (23) 
here 
 


















=−   Notice  w
that as  0 θ →  this policy converges to the policy that is optimal under the purely 
  21forward-looking model.  Given this rule, a rational expectations equilibrium exists and is 
unique when 
 




>  (24) 
βδ








π θε ⎛⎞ =− − ⎜⎟ θβ δ δ −+
. (25) 
uppose now that the benchmark model is one with 
⎝⎠
 
ˆ θ θ = . We are interested in  S
evaluating how this policy performs across the model space  [ ] 0,1 θ ∈  compared to a 
eneric rule of thumb  g tt yf π = .  
  The respective laws of motion for the state variable under the rule of thumb and 
the model-specific optimal policies are 
 




() ( ) ( )
*
11 1 ˆ 1 tt t t t Ea b y t π θβ π θπ θ θ ε +− − =− + + +   . (27) 
 
respectively.  For the rule of thumb, the solution for the state is an AR(1) process 
 
 




π ε =  (28) 
where 
λθ β θ λθ − −
 
  22 
()
() () ( )
() ()









  . (29) 





( ) ( ) 12 ,1 ,, ff λθ λθ >< 1 . (30) 
n we study.  
 
These conditions hold for the calibratio
  The model-specific optimal rule induces a law of motion for the state of the form 
 
() () () ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 112 ˆˆ ˆ 11 , , 1 tt t t t ˆ
t L EH K L π θ βγ θπ θ θ π θ θ π γ θε +−− =− − + + +− . (31) 
 our generic hybrid model, where 
 
 








θθ γθ θ θ
θ
≡+ +  and  in











=− − .  These two terms are the equilibrium coefficients 
n and are critical in understandin
model uncertainty affects the evaluation of a model-specific optimal rule.  If the 
policymaker works with the correct m
shown to vanish, i.e. 
on past inflation resulting from the implementatio g how 
odel, the backwards-looking terms in (31) can be 
() ( ) ,0   a n d    ,0 HK θθ θθ == . When the assumed model is not 
correct the, the functions  () ( ) ˆˆ ,   and   , HK θ θθ θ  are generally different from zero.  The 
intuition for this is that optimal policy exploits the presence of forward-looking agents in 
them to internalize the a
the model.  A commitme odifies the expectations of agents by forcing 
nticipated dynamics of
nt to the rule (23) m
  t π  as m
rect model, this elimi
odified by the policy rule.  When 
the rule is based on the cor nates the direct role of lags in  t π  so that 
changes in expectations exclusively drive the  t π  dynamics.  When the policy rule is 
  23optimized based on a misspecified model,  t π  depends on its own lags, which affects its 
time series properties.   
  The moving average representation of the state variable,  () tt GL π ε = can be 




  ( ) ( ) () ()









=  (32) 
hen the policymaker employs a misspecified model.  This representation is neither 
unique nor bounded unless restrictions are imposed in the roots of the autoregressive 
olynomial.  This polynomial can be rewritten as  
 




  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 123 11 , 1 , 1 , ˆˆˆ L LL θβ λθ θ λθ θ λθ θ −− − − . (33) 
 
A sufficient condition for a unique and bounded solution is 
 




which we assume.   The solution is again an ARMA(2,1) 
 
( ) ( )
() () () () () () () 12 3
ˆ 1











ε . (35)   
                                                 
24The presence of   on the right hand side of (32) is the source of potential non-
in th
0 G
uniqueness, while the possibility of a root at the denominator polynomial bigger than one 
 absolute value is  e source of potential unboundedness. Following Whiteman (1983), 
the term  0 G  is chosen so that the unstable autoregressive root  ( ) 1 ˆ ,1 λθ θ >  is cancelled 
with a root of the polynomial at the numerator in (32). Once the cancellation is 
performed, the unique bounded solution is an ARMA (2,1) as reported in the text. 
 
 
  24 
under the misspecified model.  Since the autoregressive roots  ( ) 2 ˆ , λ θθ  and  () 3 ˆ , λ θθ  are 
zero under the correct model ( ˆ θ θ = ), (35) reveals how conditioning an optimal policy on 
e wrong model will generate fluctuations in  th t π . 
  We conduct several numerical exercises to gauge the im model uncertainty 
the previous exercise, which sets  0.9, 0.99, 0.9 a
pact of 
on the policymaker’s loss when the economic model is eq. (22) . The calibration follows 
β δ = ==    , and  .1 bb == .  The 
optimal rule is constructed on the basis of the benchm
BF
ark model, where  0.5 θ = , which 
yields the optimal rule  ( )
()
10 . 2 2
0.90














π − =− . Note that the rational expectations equilibrium exists, is unique 
and bounded in all the exercises discussed below.   
  Table 5 presents losses over the model space  [ ] 0,1 θ ∈  for the optimal benchmark 
B) and the ru rule (O le of thumb (RoT ).  The Table describes average, minimum, 
frequency intervals.  Average loss is taken across th
maximum, maximum regret losse he rules for total variance and across the 
e model space under the assumption 
at
s for t
th  θ  is uniformly distributed on the interval [ ] 0,1 .   
Table 5 reveals how the compa ns between the model-specific optimal rule and 
rule of thumb depend on which frequencies are considered.  Starting with average loss, 
the OB rule dominates the 
  
riso
RoT rule at the mi ,
2
π
π ⎡⎤ d- to high frequencies, i.e. ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
.  This 
translates into the OB rule generating lower total variance.  However, RoT  is selected 










π π ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.   The average loss comparisons 
Thus, we find that the ranking of rules is sensitive to the frequency i als used to 
are mirrored in all cases by the minimax and minimax regret comparisons of the rules.  
nterv
evaluate policy, which is consistent with results reported in the previous section. 
  25  Figure 3 transform t s the total and frequency interval variances of π  under the OB 
RoT  rules found in Table 5 into plots that move pointwise th odel space,  rough the m and 
[ ] 0,1 θ ∈ .  The dashed lines denote variance generated by the OB rule, while the RoT  
variances are solid lines in Figure 3.  Figure 3-a shows that the OB rule always yields 
smaller total variance pointwise across the model space.  As Table 5 and the associated 
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y intervals.  Also consistent with Table 5 is that on the low to mid-frequency 
intervals the 
frequenc
RoT  almost always generates a smaller variances across the model space.  
Nonetheless, the OB  rule comes close to the RoT  for  [ ] 0,.4 θ ∈  on the  0,
4
π ⎡⎤  and  ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
,
42




π π ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 frequency interval at  [ ] .9,1 θ ∈ .  
Contrast this with results reported in Table 1 and Figure 1 that the RoT  dominates the 
optimal forward-looking rule,  F O , when  1 θ = . The source of the disparate results is that 
the optim ark rule   is constructed under the assump al benchm OB tion that  0.5 θ = .  This 
assump true mo
unlike the exercises reported in Table 1 and Figure 1 that do not combine the competing 
atter
tion minimizes deviations from the  del and hence model uncertainty, 
models. 
  Model uncertainty continues to m  once policy is evaluated across the entire 
spectrum for a fixed θ .  Figure 4 displays spectral densities for  t π  that are produced by 
the  OB rule and the RoT  at  0.5 θ = , 0.25, and 0.75.  Although  0.5 θ =  minimizes 
variance for the OB rule, the top panel of Figure 4 reveals that the RoT produces less 




π π ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.  At  0.25 θ =  and 
0.75, spectral densities of  t π  are qualitatively similar across the B rule and the   O RoT .  
In this case, the sup ity of OB rule is derived from its ability to reduce 
fluctuations in  t
 
erior  the 
π  at the high frequencies.  This indicates that outcomes under the OB rule 
and the RoT  are sensitive to the equency intervals on which les ar red.    fr  these ru e compa
  26Thus, policy evaluation becomes more difficult once it is recognized that model and 
preference uncertainty can interact. 
  We conclude this section by noting that there is evidence for the policymaker to 
choose the OB e over the   rul RoT .  However, this result rests on certainty about the 
policymaker’s loss function (i.e., total variance).  Our exercises acknowledge model 
uncertainty along the lines of backwards- versus forward-looking elements, but this 
e the
In this paper, we have attempted to illustrate how the case for optimal policy rules 
ance of the rules in the presence of model 
ific effects. These two dimensions interact 
al rules to go awry seems especially great for 
particular frequency-specific intervals.  This
uncertainty plays a secondary role because of the simplicity of our economic model.  
Nonetheless, our results indicat  need for policy evaluation to account for preference 
uncertainty with the same effort that is dedicated to model uncertainty. 
 
  
5. Summary and conclusions 
  
is weakened when one considers the perform
uncertainty and with respect to frequency-spec
as we observe that the potential for optim
 suggests to us that great caution should be 
taken in seriously advocating a policy that is optimal with respect to an environment, 
using the standard variance-based loss function.  While we are not so nihilistic as to 
believe such knowledge is impossible, we believe that it is often the case that 
contemporaneous scholarly discussions of macroeconomic policy pay too little attention 
to Friedman’s 1948 arguments.  Indeed, our analysis is more interventionist than his in 
that our simple rules are versions of leaning against the wind policies, which Friedman 
specifically questions because of the problem of long and variable lags in policy effects. 
We do not think it unfair to say that modern time series analysis has led to a more 
optimistic view of the information available to policymakers than assumed by 
  27Friedman.
25  Hence, we are comfortable with recommendations that are more 
interventionist than his.
26
A major weakness in our analysis is that we focus on comparisons of permanent 
rule choices.  In other words, we ask whether a policymaker should permanently prefer 
one rule or the other, without allowing for the possibility that the policymaker will learn 
about the nature of model uncertainty over time.  While this is the standard procedure in 
most of the monetary rules literature, the analysis fails to address how a rule should be 
chosen when the policymaker has the option of changing it in response to new 
information that affects the model space under consideration.  One solution is suggested 
by Svensson and Williams (2005) who treat different models as regimes across which the 
economy switches; in their analysis the model uncertainty facing a policymaker is 
equivalent to uncertainty about the regime in which the economy is currently in as the 
conditional probabilities of future regimes given the current regime state.  This is a 
promising research direction and admits progress using Markov jump process methods, 
but it treats model uncertainty in a very different way than we conceptualize it.  In our 
view, model uncertainty represents something that may be resolved over time, not 
something that exists in a steady state.  Hence the next step in the approach we take 
seems likely to draw from ideas from the theory of bandit problems rather than from the 
theory of Markov jump processes.  Further, both approaches to model uncertainty cannot 
address the issue of policy evaluation when new elements emerge in the model space 
over time.  This problem begins to link monetary policy evaluation with issues that lie at 
the frontiers of the work on decisionmaking under ambiguity, where even the most 
advanced treatment typically assumes that while the probabilities are not available for the 
object of interest, its support is known.   
Finally, we observe that our frequency-specific results suggest that a systematic 
examination of preference uncertainty is an important complement to the analysis of 
model uncertainty.  Our findings that rules that are optimal with respect to overall 
variance mask frequency tradeoffs, even when there is no model uncertainty, suggests a 
                                                 
25In fact, Friedman (1972) acknowledges some progress of this type, although worry 
about politicization preserves his skepticism of countercyclical monetary policy.  
26As such, we are sympathetic to the common sense spirit of Blinder (1998) though in our 
parlance a rule can react to the state of the economy. 
  28new dimension along which to consider the question of robustness.  Brock, Durlauf and 
Rondina (2007) show, for example, that in forward looking systems, one can design 
feedback rules that induce frequency by frequency variance reductions.  The 
consideration of this type of property as a distinct form of robustness seems a promising 
direction.   
Therefore, we see this paper as only a first step in a long research program. 
  29 
Table 1 
 






[ ] 4 0, π  
Middle-
Low 




24 , ππ  
High 
[ ] 3
4, π π  
High to 
Mid 
[ ] 2, π π  
High to 
Low 
[ ] 4, π π  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
B O   1.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.75 
F O   3.71 0.15 3.15 0.28 0.14 0.41 3.57 
F RO   1.05 0.38 0.28 0.21 0.18 0.39 0.67 
RoT   1.14 0.14 0.18 0.30 0.52 0.81 1.00 
 
Table 1 reports the loss measured by the unconditional variance of   for the backwards-looking model of 
equation (13) under four alternative policy rules:   (Optimal Backwards) – the optimal rule of the 
backwards-looking model (equation (14));   (Optimal Forward) – the optimal rule of the forward-
looking model (equation (16);   (Restricted Optimal) – the optimal rule of the forward-looking model 








π =− t . Column (1) reports the loss across the entire frequency range, columns (2)-(7) report the 















− =  and π  (ε  white noise,  ).  () tt GLε = t
2 1 ε σ =
  30Table 2 
 






[ ] 4 0, π  
Middle-
Low 




24 , ππ  
High 
[ ] 3
4, π π  
High to 
Mid 
[ ] 2, π π  
High to 
Low 
[ ] 4, π π  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
B O   0.65 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.42 0.55 0.61 
F O   0.17 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.17 
F RO   0.63 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.35 0.50 0.58 
RoT   0.81 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.64 0.74 0.78 
Table 2 reports the loss measured by the unconditional variance of   for forward-looking model of 
equation (15) under four alternative policy rules:   (Optimal Backwards) – the optimal rule of the 
backwards-looking model (equation (14));   (Optimal Forward) – the optimal rule of the forward-
looking model (equation (16));   (Restricted Optimal) – the optimal rule of the forward-looking model 









π =− t . Column (1) reports the loss across the entire frequency range, columns (2)-(7) report 















− =  and π  (ε  white noise,  ).   () tt GLε = t























[ ] 4 0, π  
Middle-
Low 




24 , ππ  
High 
[ ] 3
4, π π  
High to 
Middle 
[ ] 2, π π  
High to 
Low 
[ ] 4, π π  
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
B O   1.00  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.55 0.75 
F O   3.71 0.15 3.15 0.28 0.14 0.41 3.57 




RoT   1.14  0.14 0.18 0.30 0.64 0.81 1.00 
Minimax   B O   RoT   RoT   F RO    F O   F O   F RO  
 
Table 3 reports the maximum losses across the backwards- and forward-model models from the entries 
reported in Table 1 and in Table 2 for the four alternative policy rules  ,  ,   and RoT . Column 
(1) reports the maximum loss across the entire frequency range, columns (2)-(7) report the maximum loss 
generated at relevant frequency intervals. The entries in bold indicate the minima of the maximum losses in 
each of the columns. The bottom row of Table 3 reports the minimax policy strategies, i.e. the rules that 
would ensure at most the minimum of the maximum losses. 


















  32Table 4 
 
Minimax Regret Calculations 
 




[ ] 4 0, π  
Middle-
Low 




24 , ππ  
High 
[ ] 3
4, π π  
High to 
Middle 
[ ] 2, π π  
High to 
Low 
[ ] 4, π π  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
Backward 
B O   0.00 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.11  0.08 
F O   2.71 0.00 2.97 0.07 0.00 0.03  2.90 





RoT   0.14 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.38 0.43  0.33 
Forward 
B O   0.48 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.34 0.41  0.44 
F O   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 





RoT   0.64 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.55 0.59  0.61 
 
B O   0.48 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.34 0.41  0.44 
F O   2.71  0.00  2.97  0.07 0.00 0.03 2.90 





RoT   0.64 0.03 0.02  0.09 0.55 0.59 0.61 
Minimax 
Regret 
  F RO   F O   RoT   F O   F O   F O   F RO  
Table 4 reports losses for the regret defined by equation (6) using the backwards- and forward-looking 
models under four alternative policy rules:   (Optimal Backwards) – the optimal rule of the backwards-
looking model (equation (14));   (Optimal Forward) – the optimal rule of the forward-looking model 
(equation (16);   (Restricted Optimal) – the optimal rule of the forward-looking model in the class of 







π =− . 
The regrets are computed from the entries in Table 1 and Table 2. Column (1) reports the maximum regret 
from the losses across the entire frequency range, columns (2)-(7) report the maximum regret from the 
losses generated at relevant frequency intervals. The entries in bold indicate the minima of the maximum 
regrets in each of the columns. The bottom part of Table 4 reports the minimax-regret policy strategies, i.e. 
the rules that would ensure at most the minimum of the maximum regrets. 
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Table 5 
  
Losses Over the Model Space  [ ] 0,1 θ ∈  
 
 




[ ] 4 0, π  
Middle
-Low 




24 , ππ  
High 
[ ] 3








[ ] 4, π π  
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Average  Loss  0.84  0.08 0.18 0.25 0.33 0.58 0.75 
Min  Loss    0.61  0.03 0.06 0.15 0.21 0.50 0.57 




Max Regret  0.00  0.04 0.19 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Average  Loss  0.99  0.07 0.09 0.19 0.83 0.83 0.92 
Min  Loss    0.81  0.03 0.04 0.10 0.74 0.74 0.78 




Max Regret  0.21  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.34 0.32 0.21 
Minimax  OB   RoT   RoT    RoT   OB   OB   OB  
Minimax Regret  OB   RoT   RoT    RoT   OB   OB   OB  
 
Table 5 reports the loss measured by the unconditional variance of   for the hybrid model of equation 
(22) under two alternative policy rules: OB  (Optimal Benchmark) – the optimal rule of the benchmark 
model at  ; the RoT (Rule of Thumb) specification
t π






.  The top 8 lines report the 
average loss, the minimum loss, the maximum loss and the maximum regret  , for   as 
defined in (6) across the model space 
[] (
0,1 max , , Rp d
θ θ
∈ R
[ ] 0,1 θ ∈ .  The bold entries denote the minima of the maximum 
losses and of the maximum regrets across the two policies. The last two rows report the minimax policy 
strategy and the minimax regret policy strategy, respectively. Column (1) reports the loss and maximum 
regret measured with respect to the entire frequency range, columns (2)-(7) report the loss and maximum 
regret measured with respect to relevant frequency intervals. The loss generated at the interval 







ωω ∫ here  (  w ) ()
2 1
2
i f π ω tt G πε = hite oise, 
2 1 ε σ = ).  G e
ω
π
− =  and  L w  n
 
()  ( t ε  

































(c) Rule of Thumb
(d) Optimal Backward
 







− =  for the unconditional variance of   
(  white noise,  ), when the backwards-looking model of equation (13) is true under four 
alternative policy rules: (a)   (Optimal Forward) – the optimal rule of the forward-looking model of 
equation (16); (b)   (Restricted Optimal) – the optimal rule of the forward-looking model in the class 
of simple first-order feedback rules, equation (18); (c) the  (Rule of Thumb) of the 
form
() tt GL πε =
t ε
























































− =  for the unconditional variance of   
(  white noise,  ), when the model is of the forward-looking type (equation (15))  under the four 
alternative policy rules: (a)   (Optimal Forward) – the optimal rule of the forward-looking model of 
equation (16); (b)   (Restricted Optimal) – the optimal rule of the forward-looking model in the class 
of simple first-order feedback rules, equation (18); (c) the  (Rule of Thumb) of the 
form
() tt GL πε =
t ε
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(RoT) Rule of Thumb
 
(a) 










(RoT) Rule of Thumb






Variance for ω ∈ [π /4 , π /2]







Variance for ω ∈ [π /2 , 3π /4]







Variance for ω ∈ [3π /4 , π ]








Variance for ω ∈ [π /2 , π ]












(f)  (g) 
 
The top panel of Figure 3 reports the total unconditional variance for   for the hybrid model of equation 
(22) across the model space, 
t π
[ ] 0,1 θ ∈ . The unconditional variance is computed under two alternative 
policy rule: (a) OB (Optimal Benchmark Rule) – the policy rule that is optimal for the benchmark model 
 where  ; (b)  theRoT  (Rule of Thumb) of the form  . The bottom 
panels of Figure 3 reports the portions of the overall unconditional variance for   (under the same 
alternative policy rules) generated at relevant frequency intervals.  
ˆ θθ = ˆ .5 θ = () ( ˆ 1.25/ tt yb θπ =− )
t π
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(RoT) Rule of Thumb
 
(a) 































(RoT) Rule of Thumb
(b) 











































− =  for the unconditional variance of 
 (ε  white noise,  ), for the hybrid model of equation (22). The top panel reports the 
spectral densities for the model   under two alternative policy rules: (a) OB (Optimal Benchmark 
Rule) – the policy rule that is optimal for the benchmark model   where  ; (b)  the  (Rule 
of Thumb) of the form
() tt ε GL π = t
2 1 ε σ =
.5 θ =




π =− t . The bottom left and bottom right panels report spectral densities for 
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